India and Day 26 – Part 4: Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai – 2


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Myself By T.V. Antony Raj

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Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Jama’at-ud-Da’wah

The Face of Terrorism. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, head of the banned Pakistani charity Jama'at-ud-Da'wah and co-founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba. (Source: centralasiaonline.com)

The Face of Terrorism. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, head of the banned Pakistani charity Jama’at-ud-Da’wah and co-founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba. (Source: centralasiaonline.com)

India submitted a formal request to the United Nations Security Council to put the group Jama’at-ud-Da’wah (JuD) and its founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed on the list of individuals and organizations sanctioned by the United Nations for association with terrorism. India accused JuD and its leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, of being virtually interchangeable with Lashkar- e-Taiba (LeT). India said that the close links between the organizations, as well as the 2,500 offices and 11 seminaries that JuD maintains in Pakistan, “are of immediate concern with regard to their efforts to mobilize and orchestrate terrorist activities.

On December 10, 2008, in an interview with Pakistan’s Geo television, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed denied the link between JuD and LeT stating that “no Lashkar-e-Taiba man is in Jama’at-ud-Da’wah and I have never been a chief of Lashkar-e-Taiba.

On December 11, 2008, Hafiz Muhammed Saeed was placed under house arrest by Pakistan when the United Nations declared Jama’at-ud-Da’wah to be a LeT front. He was held in house arrest under the Maintenance of Public Order law, which allows authorities to detain temporarily individuals deemed likely to create disorder. In early June 2009 the Lahore High Court, deeming the containment to be unconstitutional, ordered Hafiz Muhammad Saeed to be released. India immediately expressed its disappointment with the decision of the Lahore High Court.

On January 7, 2009, Pakistan’s Information Minister Sherry Rehman officially accepted Ajmal Kasab was a Pakistan national, and registered a case against three other Pakistani nationals.

On February 12, 2009, Pakistan’s Interior Minister Rehman Malik asserted that parts of the attack had been planned in Pakistan.

On July 6, 2009, the Pakistani government filed an appeal of the Lahore High Court’s decision. Shah Khawar, Deputy Attorney General of Pakistan, told the Associated Press that “Hafiz Saeed at liberty is a security threat.

On August 25, 2009, Interpol issued a Red-corner Notice against Hafiz Saeed, along with Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi, in response to Indian requests for his extradition.

Hafiz Muhammad Saeed was again placed under house arrest by the Pakistani authorities in September 2009. However, on October 12, 2009, the Lahore High Court expunged all cases against Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and set him free. The court also notified that Jama’at-ud-Da’wah is not a banned organization and can function freely in Pakistan. Justice Asif Saeed Khosa, one of two judges hearing the case, observed “In the name of terrorism we cannot brutalise the law.

Here are some of the other Pakistani terrorist leaders who were at the heels of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks:

  • Abdul Rehman Makki, the brother-in-law of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, second in command of Lashkar-e-Taiba, alleged to be holding out in Pakistan. The United States has announced a reward of $2 million for information leading to the location of Makki.
  • Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, a Senior member of LeT in custody of Pakistan armed forces. He has been named as one of the masterminds of the Mumbai attack.
  • Yusuf Muzammil, a Senior member of LeT. He has been named as one of the masterminds of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks by Ajmal Kasab.
  • Zarrar Shah, one of LeT’s primary liaisons to the ISI. He is in Pakistani custody. An American official said that he was a “central figure” in the planning behind the 2008 Mumbai attacks. In fact, Zarrar Shah had boasted to Pakistani investigators about his role in the attacks.
  • Muhammad Ashraf, LeT’s top financial officer, although not directly connected to the 2008 Mumbai plot, was added to the United Nation’s list of people that sponsor terrorism after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. However, Geo TV reported that six years earlier Ashraf became seriously ill while in custody and died at Civil Hospital on June 11, 2002.
  • Mahmoud Mohamed Ahmed Bahaziq, the leader of LeT in Saudi Arabia and one of its financiers, though not directly connected to the Mumbai plot, after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the U.N. added him to its list of individuals that sponsor terrorism.

Even a year after the attacks, Mumbai police continued to complain that Pakistani authorities were not cooperating by providing information for their investigation.

Meanwhile, journalists in Pakistan said security agencies were preventing them from interviewing people from Kasab’s village.

Kasab was charged with 86 offenses, including murder and waging war against the Indian state, in a charge-sheet running to more than 11,000 pages.

On May 6, 2010, a trial court sentenced Ajmal Kasab to death on all the 86 charges for which he was convicted. He appealed against this verdict. On February 21, 2011, the Bombay High Court and on August 29, 2012, the Supreme Court of India upheld his death sentence.

Former Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram said the Pakistani authorities had not shared any information about American suspects David Coleman Headley, and Tahawwur Hussain Rana, but the FBI had been more forthcoming.

An Indian report, summarizing the intelligence gained from India’s interrogation of David Headley, was released in October 2010. It alleged that Pakistan’s intelligence agency (ISI) had provided support for the attacks by providing funding for reconnaissance missions in Mumbai. The report included Headley’s claim that Lashkar-e-Taiba‘s chief military commander, Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, had close ties to the ISI. Headley alleged that “every big action of LeT is done in close coordination with [the] ISI.

On November 21, 2012, Ajmal Kasab was executed by hanging in Yerwada Jail in Pune, southeast of Mumbai, amid great secrecy, underscoring the political sensitivity of the November 26, 2008, Mumbai massacre. His body was buried in the “surrounding area” of the jail. It was the first time a capital sentence had been carried out in India since 2004.

There was celebration on the streets of Mumbai and other cities as news of the execution spread. People set off fireworks and handed out sweets sparking celebration days before the fourth anniversary of the assault on the financial capital of India.

Militant groups in Pakistan reacted angrily, as did the residents of Faridkot, Ajmal Kasab’s home village.

The Taliban threatened revenge unless India returns the body of Ajmal Kasab. Pakistani Taliban spokesman Ahsanullah Ahsan demanded that Kasab’s body be given back to his family or handed over to the Taliban. From an undisclosed location, Ahsan told The Associated Press by telephone:

If his body is not given to us or his family, we will, god willing, carry on his mission, we will take revenge for his murder.

After the hanging then Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde said:

All the police officers and personnel who lost their life in the battle against the terrorists have today been served justice.

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India and Day 26 – Part 4: Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai – 1


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Myself By T.V. Antony Raj

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Finally, on 26 November, the GPS had sounded their arrival off the coast of Mumbai, and they had called Karachi to find out what to do with the captured captain. It fell to Ajmal Kasab to act. He had just turned twenty-one and felt compelled to prove his worth. Two others held the Indian sailor down, while Ajmal slit his throat. Blooded, they jumped into a yellow dinghy that pulled them onwards towards the glistening Indian city.” – An excerpt from the prologue of The Seige: Three Days of Terror Inside the Taj by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy.

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On the evening of Wednesday, November 26, 2008, televisions all over the world broadcast the breaking news that Mumbai,  India’s largest city with a population of 18 million was virtually under siege with twelve coordinated shooting and bombing incidents.

The 10 terrorists who took part in the attacks were young men. On November 21, 2008, they left Karachi, Pakistan in a boat and travelled for thirty-eight hours, remaining undetected by the Indian Navy. Each of them was carrying 6 to 7 magazines of 30 rounds each plus 400 rounds not loaded in magazines, 8 hand grenades, one AK-47 assault rifle, an automatic loading revolver, credit cards and a supply of dried fruit.

On November 23, the terrorists hijacked an Indian fishing trawler, the Kuber. They killed four fishermen and ordered the captain of the trawler to sail to India.

On November 26, when they were four nautical miles (7 kilometers) from Mumbai they killed the captain of the trawler and boarding three inflatable speedboats reached the Colaba jetty at 8:10 pm.

The identity of the attackers was not immediately known. Initial reports said they were young men wearing jeans and tee-shirts.

Map of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks

Map of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks

Eight attacks took place in South Mumbai: at Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, Oberoi/Trident Hotel, the Taj Mahal Palace & Tower, the Leopold Cafe, Cama Hospital, the Nariman House renamed Chabad House – a Jewish community center, the Metro Cinema, in a lane behind the Times of India building, St. Xavier’s College, a domestic airport and a police station.

There was also an explosion at Mazagaon, in Mumbai’s port area, and in a taxi at Vile Parle.

Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, Mumbai - After the terrorist attack (Source: outlookindia.com)

Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, Mumbai – After the terrorist attack (Source: outlookindia.com)

The terrorists opened fire and set off Grenades in several locations. In the hotels they sought out foreign nationals, particularly British and American citizens.  Hostages were taken during the attacks.

Around 450 people were staying in the Taj Mahal Hotel at that time. It was hosting a parliamentary conference and a number of visiting dignitaries were ensnared in the violence. The terrorists set fire and destroyed the hotel’s roof. At least 31 people were killed by the terrorists at Taj.

By the early morning of November 28, the Mumbai Police and security forces secured all sites except the Taj hotel.

The panic lasted until Saturday, November 29, 2008.

Terror attack at Taj Hotel, Mumbai on  November 26, 2008. (Source: ramanan50.wordpress.com)

Terror attack at Taj Hotel, Mumbai on November 26, 2008. (Source: ramanan50.wordpress.com)

On November 29, India’s National Security Guards (NSG) conducted the Operation Black Tornado to flush out the assailants. The commandos killed all the terrorists barricaded in the hotel and the three-day long siege.

The only attacker captured alive, 21-year-old Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab, upon interrogation confessed that the attackers were members of Lashkar-e-Taiba. He said that 24 terrorists received training in marine warfare at a remote camp in mountainous Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir in Pakistan and he was one of them.

Lashkar-e-Taiba is one of the largest and most active terrorist organizations in South Asia, operating primarily from Pakistan. This militant network is closely linked to al-Qaeda, and is considered a terrorist organization by India, Pakistan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations among others.

Kasab also revealed that the attacks were conducted with the support of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the mastermind behind the carnage who directed the attacks from Pakistan via mobile phones and VoIP.

Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab in the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus during the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab in the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus during the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Pictures of Ajmal Kasab, the boyish-looking gunman wearing a black T-shirt and toting an AK-47 assault rifle as he strode through Mumbai’s railway station were published around the world.

India was traumatized by the three-day terror attacks, which drew widespread global condemnation. The terrorists killed 167 people and wounded at least 308 people. The casualties were mostly Indian citizens, although westerners carrying foreign passports were singled out.

The Government of India said the terrorists came from Pakistan and their controllers were in Pakistan.

Pakistan initially denied that its nationals were responsible for the attacks and it blamed plotters in Bangladesh and criminal elements in India, for the attacks. But India refuted this claim.

Then Pakistan said they needed information from India on other bombings first.

The officials in India supplied evidence to Pakistan and other governments, in the form of interrogations, call records of conversations during the attacks, and weapons used in the Mumbai terror attacks. The Indian government officials alleged that the attacks were so sophisticated that they must have received official support from Pakistani ‘agencies’, an accusation denied by Pakistan.

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The Tupamaros, Terrorists of Uruguay – Part 9: Restoration of Democracy in Uruguay


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.Myself . By T.V. Antony Raj

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In March 1985, after the restoration of democracy in Uruguay, a law was passed granting amnesty to people who had been prosecuted by the dictatorship due to ideological reasons. The Tupamaro prisoners were set free under this law that covered political and related military crimes committed since 1962.

Former guerrilla José Mujica (left), with fellow political prisoners Adolfo Wassen Jr., and Mauricio Rossenco on March 14, 1985, the day they were freed. (Source: AFP/Getty Images)

Former guerrilla Jose Mujica (left), with fellow political prisoners Adolfo Wassen Jr., and Mauricio Rossenco on March 14, 1985, the day they were freed. (Source: AFP/Getty Images)

Raúl Sendic and José Mujica were released after imprisonment for over 14 years.

The MLN-T publicly renounced armed struggle and committed itself to left-wing parliamentary politics.

When academic freedom and university autonomy were restored in 1985, student organizations, repressed during the military regime, reestablished themselves. Several professors, dismissed for ideological reasons during the repression, were allowed to return to their posts.

During the late 1980s, labor unions and labor activists, targets of repression under the military regime resumed their labor activities leading to several labor actions and strikes that caused localized disruption of day-to-day activities.

Almost all labor grievances were resolved quickly, and none of the labor actions and strikes led to serious violence. In 1986, during a strike by the staff of the state-owned Administración Nacional de Combustibles, Alcohol, y Portland (ANCAP), the military stepped in to ensure distribution of fuel, but did not act in a law enforcement capacity.

During the late 1980s, human rights groups – local and international – were allowed  to operate freely in Uruguay and these groups did not publish any credible reports of killings or disappearances during this period because the constitution forbade brutal treatment of prisoners, and there were fewer accusations of torture of prisoners after 1985. The most dramatic exception took place in mid-1989, when a bricklayer died while in police custody. This led to charges of police brutality and mistreatment. Although the police maintained the man hanged himself in his cell, controversy over the case led to the resignation of the minister of the interior and to the conviction of a deputy police chief for misconduct.

Raúl Sendic was afflicted with Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). He died on April 28, 1989 in Paris. His remains rest today in Montevideo.

José “Pepe” Mujica addresses a crowd at the beginning of his legitimate political career, on September 29, 1985. (Photo:  Marcelo Isarrualde)

José “Pepe” Mujica addresses a crowd at the beginning of his legitimate political career, on September 29, 1985. (Photo: Marcelo Isarrualde)

In July 1986, a reorganized MLN-T appeared in the political arena with a marginal force of some several hundred members, and so, was politically insignificant. It was not legally recognized until May 1989. In order to run candidates in the November 1989 elections, the MLN-T, together with other ultra-leftist forces – the PVP, PST, and MRO – created the Movimiento de Participación Popular (MPP), a political party that was accepted within the Frente Amplio coalition.

At the end of 1986, Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado (The Law on the Expiration of the Punitive Claims of the State), called in short Ley de Caducidad (the Expiry Law) granted amnesty of sorts to the members of the military who committed crimes against humanity during the civic-military dictatorship of Uruguay. This law, co-written by legislators of Colorado and National parties and supported by the main opposition leader, Wilson Ferreira Aldunate was proposed by the first government of Julio María Sanguinetti. The Frente Amplio and other political and social organizations vehemently opposed the law. However, the law was passed by the Uruguayan Parliament on December 22, 1986 and published bearing the number 15848.

Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado (Source: federaciondebasespatriagrande.blogspot.in)

Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado (Source: http://federaciondebasespatriagrande.blogspot.in)

Human rights groups took serious exception to this law providing amnesty for military and police personnel charged with committing human rights abuses under the military regime. According to a study by the General Assembly, about 46 members of the military and police benefited from the amnesty. Human rights groups, however, claimed that the real number was well over 100. Military and police officers charged with corruption or with financial irregularities were not covered under the amnesty.

Though extremely controversial in nature, this law is still in force. In 1989 and 2009, Uruguayans voted in referendums and both times decided to keep the law.

Frente Amplio (English: Broad Front)

Until the 1971 elections, the Colorado and National parties together accounted for 90 percent of the votes cast; the remaining 10 percent of the votes were divided among various small parties. From 1984 onwards, some of the minor parties followed the lead of the major parties and sought to enhance their electoral chances through coalitions, such as the Frente Amplio (FA) (English: Broad Front).

Bandera del Frente Amplio (English: Flag of the Broad Front)

Bandera del Frente Amplio (English: Flag of the Broad Front)

Frente Amplio was founded in 1971 as a coalition of more than a dozen fractured leftist parties and movements. General Liber Seregni was the inaugural president of the front and its first nominee for the presidency of the nation. The front was declared illegal during 1973 military coup d’état. It emerged again in 1984 when democracy was restored in Uruguay.

In July 1986, a reorganized MLN-T appeared in the political arena with a marginal force of some several hundred members, and so, was politically insignificant. It was not legally recognized until May 1989. In order to run candidates in the November 1989 elections, the MLN-T, together with other ultra-leftist forces – the PVP, PST, and MRO – created the Movimiento de Participación Popular (MPP), a political party that was accepted within the Frente Amplio coalition.

By May 1989, the Frente Amplio consisted of a coalition of 14 political parties.

In 1989, the Frente Amplio won in the Montevideo municipal elections, its first win on the national level. The traditional two-party system was threatened for the first time by the victory of Frente Amplio.

The Frente Amplio was organized like the communist party. It had a party congress with decision-making powers, under which was the national plenum, a central committee-like body. A president, headed the 108-member national plenum, which met at least once every two months. A political bureau, which included the president, exercised day-to-day authority.

In 1990, the Colorado and National parties and, to a lesser extent, the Frente Amplio coalition, were the three major political entities in Uruguay.

In 1990, MLN-T published a newspaper and operated a radio station in Montevideo.

In the 1994 general elections, José Mujica was elected deputy. When he arrived at the parliament building on a Vespa scooter, a surprised parking attendant asked him: “Are you going to be here long?”

Mujica replied: “I certainly hope so.”

In 1999, José Mujica was elected senator.

Due in part to Mujica’s charisma, the Movimiento de Participación Popular (MPP) continued to grow in popularity and votes, and by 2004 it had become the largest of any faction within the Frente Amplio. In the elections of that year, Mujica was re-elected to the Senate, and the MPP obtained over 300,000 votes, thus consolidating its position as the primary political force within the coalition and a major force behind the victory of presidential candidate Tabaré Ramón Vázquez Rosas.

On March 1, 2005, President Tabaré Vázquez appointed José Mujica as the Minister of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries since Mujica’s own professional background was in the agricultural sector. Upon becoming minister, Mujica resigned his position as a senator. He held this position until a cabinet change in 2008, and returned to his seat in the Senate.

Jose Mujica and his wife Lucia Topolansky (Source: nsnbc.me)

Jose Mujica and his wife Lucia Topolansky (Source: nsnbc.me)

In 2005, after many years of living together, José Mujica married Lucía Topolansky, a former Tupamaro who orchestrated the raid on Financiera Monty. They have no children. Having declined to live in the opulent presidential palace or use its staff, the couple lives on a farm in the outskirts of Montevideo. They cultivate chrysanthemums for sale.

On November 17, 2006, former president, Juan Maria Bordaberry, and his former foreign minister Juan Carlos Blanco Estradé were placed under arrest following an order by the judge Roberto Timbal, in connection with the 1976 assassination in Buenos Aires, Argentina, of two legislators, Senator Zelmar Michelini of the Christian Democratic Party and House leader Héctor Gutiérrez of the National Party as part of Operation Condor. The prosecution argued the assassinations were a part of Operation Condor in which the military regimes of Uruguay and Argentina coordinated actions against dissidents. Judge Timbal ruled that since the killings took place outside Uruguay, they were not covered by the amnesty enacted after the return of civilian rule in 1985.

In 2009, the Uruguayan election took place amid a series of landmark prosecutions for human rights abuses perpetrated during the 1973-1985 military regime. Gregorio Alvarez, the last of Uruguay’s dictators, was sentenced to 25 years in prison for his participation in the bloody “Operation Condor.”

The first round of the presidential election on October 25, 2009, featured three main candidates:

  1. Pedro Bordaberry of the Colorado Party (and son of a former Uruguayan dictator).
  2. Former President Luis Alberto Lacalle (1990-1995) of the center-right National Party.
  3. José “Pepe” Mujica, ex-Tupamaru guerrilla of the ruling and left-leaning Frente Amplio coalition.

In the first round of voting, the charismatic Mujica got about 48 percent of the votes compared to 30 percent for Lacalle.

José Mujica and President Tabaré Ramón Vázquez Rosas (2005-2010) (Source: demlab.wordpress.com)

José Mujica and President Tabaré Ramón Vázquez Rosas (2005-2010) (Source: demlab.wordpress.com)

The second round of voting took place on November 29, 2009. José Mujica won the presidential election with over 50 percent of the votes, expected to continue the moderate left policies of President Tabare Vazquez.

José Mujica took the office of president of Uruguay on March 1, 2010.

Following are the only words he said to the media that day:

Despite all this lip service, the world is not going to change.”

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The Tupamaros, Terrorists of Uruguay – Part 8: The Military Government (1973-85)


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Myself . By T.V. Antony Raj

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Juan Maria Bordaberry - President of Uruguay

Juan Maria Bordaberry – President of Uruguay (Source: lainformacion.com)

In 1973, after the military staged a coup, the Uruguayan military’s “Doctrine of National Security,” a pseudo-scientific analysis of society grounded in geopolitics, postulated that sovereignty no longer resided in the people, but derived instead from the necessities of state survival.

This was in essence the same ideology made famous by the Brazilian generals after their takeover in 1964. The core of this doctrine was expressed by Brazil’s General Artur Golbery do Couto e Silva in his book “Geopolítica do Brasil,” which basically, describes a world split into two opposing blocs. The capitalist and Christian West on one side, and the communist and atheistic East on the other, each with its own beliefs that were deemed implacable.

Like the Brazilian generals, the Uruguayan generals too considered themselves factored in the Western bloc and were accordingly involved in a relentless  confrontation with the resistance. This struggle warranted a conflict wherein there was absolutely no room for wavering or doubt against a clever, cunning and ruthless antagonist. Consequently, it was essential to compromise on a number of secular freedoms to protect and save the country.

The Uruguayan military regime intensified its “Preventive” repression. Thousands of Uruguayans were jailed, accused of politically motivated crimes. Many were sacked from their government jobs for political reasons. While many were tortured and killed. A whole lot of people, considered by the dictatorship as political or ideological threat to the military junta, just disappeared - another method of the military to silence the opposition and break the determination of the guerillas.

The civil-military dictatorship restricted freedom of the press and associations, and banned political party activities. The junta imprisoned, killed, and tortured hundreds of Tupamaros including most of its leaders.

José Mujica spent most of the 1970s in and out of prison. He escaped several times, only to be caught again.

Raúl Sendic (1926—1989, prominent Uruguayan Marxist lawyer, unionist and founder of the Tupamaros National Liberation Movement (MLN-T)

Raúl Sendic (1926—1989, prominent Uruguayan Marxist lawyer, unionist and founder of the Tupamaros National Liberation Movement (MLN-T)

After the military coup in 1973, Raúl Sendic and other MLN-T leaders including José Mujica were apprehended. They served 14 years of imprisonment.

Sendic and eight other leaders were singled out as “special” prisoners. They were shuttled around in groups of three between military prisons and were placed in solitary confinement in dungeon-like cells with revolting sanitary conditions. At a military base in Paso de los Toros, a city of the Tacuarembó Department in Uruguay, Mujica and other Tupamaro guerrillas were confined for more than two years at the bottom of a drained pool, with sheet metal placed atop to block the sunlight.

Joes Mujica

The Tupamaros were subjected to continuous physical and psychological torture. At one stage, Mujica went mad. He started hearing static, as if a radio stuck between stations had been left on. He would scream for someone to turn it off. However, even while serving his prison sentence, Mujica continued to maintain his contact with other Tupamaro leaders, including Raúl Sendic.

Some Tupamaros became insane, while others slowly changed their ideological outlook.

In 1973, when the military took power into their hands, they did so in the face of a decade and a half of economic stagnation, high inflation, and increased social unrest. Massive repression by the armed forces brought the social unrest under control and eliminated the urban guerrilla threat. Economic policy and performance soon became the regime’s ultimate claim to legitimacy and justification for its harsh rule.

In 1976, as reported by Amnesty International, Uruguay had more political prisoners per capita than any other nation around the world, and around 10% of its population emigrated for economic or political reasons.

Operation Condor

Operación Cóndor

Operation Condor (Spanish: Operación Cóndor; Portuguese: Operação Condor) was formally launched in 1975 by the right-wing dictatorships of the Southern Cone of South America. Condor’s key members were the governments in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil. The governments of Ecuador and Peru joined later in more peripheral roles.

This clandestine operation was created to expunge communist and Soviet influence and ideas, and to suppress active or potential opposition movements against the participating governments. It was a campaign of political repression and terror involving intelligence operations and assassination of opponents.

By 1976 Operation Condor, which had already accumulated centralized information from South American intelligence agencies for years, was at its peak.

Operation Condor, took place in the context of the Cold War between Western societies and the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc.

Chile - The dictator Augusto Pinochet shakes hands with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (Source: elciudadano.cl)

Chile – The dictator Augusto Pinochet shakes hands with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (Source: elciudadano.cl)

According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents released in 2002, Operation Condor’s policies and brutal methods were known and tolerated by the State Department of the United States, led by Henry Kissinger under the Gerald Ford’s presidency. In fact, Operation Condor had the tacit approval of the United States, which provided technical support and supplied military aid to the participants until at least 1978, and again after Republican Ronald Reagan became president in 1981.

Some estimate the actual number of deaths directly attributable to Operación Cóndor to 60,000, and possibly more.

National elections were to be held in Uruguay in 1976. Unfortunately, on May 18, 1976, Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz, a Uruguayan political figure and member of the National Party, was abducted by a paramilitary group of Operación Cóndor. On May 21, 1976, his body along with three other bodies were found in an abandoned Torino sedan, at the corner of Perito Moreno and Dellepiane in Buenos Aires. The other three were Zelmar Michelini, former senator and member of the Broad Front, and two Tupamaros militants, William Whitelaw and Rosario del Carmen Barredo. All four of them had been tortured before they were killed.

On June 1976, President Bordaberry submitted a proposal to the military calling for the elimination of political parties and the creation of a permanent dictatorship with himself as president. The armed forces forced him to resign. Bordaberry was replaced by Alberto Demichelli Lizaso, president of the Council of State, who, through Institutional Act No. 1, decreed the suspension of elections. Three months later, Aparicio Méndez, succeeded Demichelli. Méndez essentially decreed the political participation of all individuals who had taken part in the 1966 and 1971 elections. Political life in Uruguay came to a halt.

In 1977, the military government made public its political plans, namely, over the following few years, the National Party and the Colorado Party would be purged, a new constitution would be submitted to a referendum.

In 1980, a charter that bestowed the military implicit veto power over all government policies was drafted up by the chiefs of the armed forces, and they chose to legitimize themselves by submitting this constitution to a referendum. This constitutional project was opposed by Batlle Ibáñez, Carlos Julio Pereyra, Pachequist dissidents, a Herrerist faction led by Luis Alberto Lacalle de Herrera, and the Broad Front. They considered it authoritarian and in conflict with Uruguay’s democratic way of life.

When the citizens of Uruguay voted, they expressed their dissent by rejecting the proposed new constitution by 57% to 43% thereby dealing a tremendous blow to the military regime.

The Reemergence of Political Parties (1980-84)

After the electoral defeat of the military’s constitution, retired Lieutenant General Gregorio Alvarez Armelino, one of the leaders of the coup, became president of Uruguay. Political dialogue was slowly restored and the “1982 Political Parties Law” was enacted to regulate the election of political leaders, the functioning of political conventions, and the preparation of political platforms. The new law excluded the left from participating to avoid a return to the situation prior to 1973.

In 1982, the candidates of the National Party, the Colorado Party, and the Unión Cívica, a small conservative Catholic party, were elected. Although officially banned, candidates belonging to a divided left also participated. Some Uruguyans cast blank ballots, while others believed it would be more useful to back the democratic sectors of traditional parties.

The election results were once again a blow to the military because sectors in both traditional parties opposing the dictatorship won overwhelmingly.

After the 1982 elections, the dialogue between politicians and the military gathered momentum though there were setbacks.

In 1964, the Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) was founded, but it was dissolved in the wake of a general strike in 1973, when 18 council members just “disappeared”. The Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores (PIT) reclaimed the banner of the CNT and was authorized to hold a public demonstration on May 1, 1983. Later, the union was restored under the present name Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores – Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (PIT-CNT) to show its link with the earlier organization.

In November 1983, all opposition parties including the left staged a massive political rally, demanding elections with full restoration of democratic norms and without political proscriptions.

Students, united under the Asociación Social y Cultural de Estudiantes de la Enseñanza Pública (ASCEEP), were allowed to march through the streets of Montevideo.

In March 1984, the PIT organized a civil strike and freed General Líber Seregni Mosquera, leader of the Broad Front, imprisoned since January 11, 1976, by the military regime.

By mid-1984 yet another civil strike took place, this time organized by political parties and social groups.

Julio María Sanguinetti Coirolo - President of Uruguay from March 1985 until March 1990, and again, from March 1995 until March 2000.

Julio María Sanguinetti Coirolo – President of Uruguay from March 1985 until March 1990, and again, from March 1995 until March 2000.

On November 25, 1984, general elections were held in Uruguay. Julio María Sanguinetti Coirolo, a Uruguayan politician, lawyer and journalist, and former Minister for Industry and Commerce, during the presidency of Jorge Pacheco, won 31.2% of the votes, defeating Alberto Zumarán of the National Party.

After being sworn in as president on March 1, 1985, Sanguinetti led the transition to democracy with dignity and fairness, although the legacy of human rights violations under the dictatorship proved a fly in the ointment.

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The Tupamaros, Terrorists of Uruguay – Part 7: The Coup d’état of 1973


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.Myself . By T.V. Antony Raj

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On December 16, 1971, a Board of Commanders in Chief (Junta de comandantes) consisting of the Chiefs and the Joint Staff (Esmaco) of the Armed Forces was formed in Uruguay. The role of the military in political life continued to increase.

Juan Maria Bordaberry at a public ceremony in Montevideo in 1972. (Photograph:  Panta Astiazaran/AFP)

Juan Maria Bordaberry at a public ceremony in Montevideo in 1972. (Photograph: Panta Astiazaran/AFP)

On February 15, 1972, Juan María Bordaberry Arocena, a Uruguayan politician and member of one of the most powerful families of cattle ranchers was declared the winner in the presidential election. On March 1, 1972, Bordaberry took office of the president for a term of five years.

Bordaberry after being elected president at first bowed to military demands for control of the executive. Then, he became an enthusiastic advocate of military rule. As president, Bordaberry continued to follow the path taken by his predecessor Jorge Pacheco-Areco’s authoritarian methods: suspending civil liberties, banning labor unions, and imprisoning and killing opposition figures. He appointed military officers to most leading government positions.

On April 15, 1972, the Uruguayan Congress introduced the “state of internal war” with restriction of constitutional guarantees.

On October 31, 1972, Augusto Legnani, the Minister of Defense, had to resign for failing to remove a chief in charge of a mission of high importance for the ministry.

On February 8, 1973, with the purpose of controlling the buildup of military pressure, President Bordaberry replaced Armando Malet, the Minister of National Defense with retired General Antonio Francese. The chiefs of the armed forces opposed the appointment of a civilian as minister of national defense. This led to a deep conflict between President Bordaberry and the chiefs of the armed forces. The military commanders balked at the president’s fascist ideas and wanted to replace him with a pliant “yes-man”.

At 8:00 pm on the same day, the commanders of the Army and the Air Forces announced from the state television network that they would disavow any orders by minister Francese and demanded the president to withdraw his appointment. However, at 10:30 pm Bordaberry announced from the (private) Canal 4 that he would keep Francese in the Ministry and called on the citizens to gather in Plaza Independencia, in front of Casa de Gobierno (Government House).

On the morning of February 9, 1973 the new minister met with the commanders of the three forces and found support only in the Navy.

In the early hours of the morning of February 9, Naval Infantry barricaded the entrance to Ciudad Vieja of Montevideo. The army responded by putting its tanks onto the streets and occupied various radio stations, from which they exhorted the members of the Navy to join them.

On February 9 and 10, 1972, the army issued two communiques proposing a series of political, social, and economic measures.

On February 10, 1972, three ministers sought a reconciliation with the rebel commanders, so that President Bordaberry could continue to retain his position as the president of the nation.

On February 11, 1972, Vice Admiral Juan José Zorrilla resigned from the Navy Command, after several Navy officers who initially pledged their allegiance to the president, supported the stand taken by the commanders of the Army and Air Force.

On February 12, 1972, President Bordaberry reluctantly accepted all the demands of the military commanders. After negotiating his continuation as president, he signed the Pacto de Boiso Lanza that guaranteed their advisory role and their participation in political decision making.

The day after signing the pact, Néstor Bolentini was appointed as Minister of Interior and Walter Ravenna as Minister of National Defense. This completed the slide into a civil-military government, which formally ruled civilians, but in fact the center of power had moved into the ambit of the military.

In effect, the pact constituted a quasi-coup that relegated the responsibility of providing security for national development to the Armed Forces.

From this point in Uruguayan history, the Spanish word “bordaberrización” came into existence, to refer to the way a civilian president, cloaked a military dictatorship under a democratic guise. Hence, the term “bordaberrization” now refers to “dictatorships in civilian clothing.”

On February 23, 1973, by Decree No. 163/973, the Consejo de Seguridad Nacional de Uruguay, (National Security Council of Uruguay) abbreviated as “COSENA” was created as an advisory body to the Executive Power of Uruguay. Initially, its permanent members were the president of the Republic, the Commanders in Chief of the Armed Forces, the Ministers of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Finance, and the Director of the Office of Planning and Budget.

The conflicts between the chiefs of the armed forces and the General Assembly, which was investigating charges of torture perpetrated by the military and felt that the military had exceeded its powers, escalated. The military then pushed for the final approval and implementation of the State Security Law.

The real coup d’état took place on June 27, 1973, when President Bordaberry supported by the Armed Forces, dissolved the Cámaras de Senadores (chambers of senators) and Representantes (representatives) and created a State Council with legislative, constitutional and administrative functions, restricted freedom of thought and speech. The president empowered the armed forces and the police to ensure the uninterrupted provision of public services ostensibly, to subdue the Tupamaros.

On that day of the coup, in a speech broadcast on radio and television, Bordaberry said:

Afirmo hoy, una vez más y en circunstancia trascendentes para la vida del país, nuestra profunda vocación democrática y nuestra adhesión sin reticencias al sistema de organización política y social que rige la convivencia de los uruguayos. Y va con ellos entonces el rechazo a toda ideología de origen marxista que intente aprovechar de la generosidad de nuestra democracia, para presentarse como doctrina salvadora y terminar como instrumento de opresión totalitaria.

Este paso que hemos tenido que dar no conduce y no va a limitar las libertades ni los derechos de la persona humana.

para eso además hemos cometido esas funciones al Consejo de Estado y más allá, aún por encima de todo ello, está el pueblo uruguayo que nunca dejó de avasallar sus libertades (…).

Translation:

“I affirm today, once again, in circumstances of extreme importance to national life, our deep commitment to democracy and our unreserved commitment to a system of political and social organization governing the coexistence of Uruguayans. And together with this goes the rejection of all ideology of Marxist origin attempting to exploit the generosity of our democracy, to appear as a doctrine of salvation and end as a tool of totalitarian oppression.

This step that we had to take, will not limit the freedoms and rights of the individual.

We ourselves are here monitoring and furthermore, we have committed these functions to the State Council and beyond, and yet above all, are the Uruguayan people who have never permitted their freedoms to be trampled (…).”

Inherently, this speech, marked the inception of dictatorship in Uruguay. The military’s “Doctrine of National Security” was a pseudoscientific analysis of society grounded in geopolitics. It postulated that sovereignty no longer resided in the people, but derived instead from the requirements of state survival.

Some Colorados (the Pachequist faction) and some Blancos (Aguerrondo’s Herrerists) supported these moves. But the leftist trade union federations, namely, the National Confederation of Workers (CNT) called for the occupation of factories and struck work.

The civil-military dictatorship banned the CNT, the PCU, and other existing and alleged Marxist-Leninist organizations, all political parties, trade unions, and associations declaring them as illegal. The armed forces entered the university to quell dissident activities by students.

The general strike, the longest in the history of the country, lasted 15 days, and ended with most of the trade union leaders in jail or dead. Some sought refuge in Argentina.

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The Tupamaros, Terrorists of Uruguay – Part 6: Operation El Abuso, the Great Escape


.Myself . By T.V. Antony Raj

 

Aerial view of Punta Carretas (Source: panoramio.com)

Aerial view of Punta Carretas (Source: panoramio.com)

The Arrests

The penitentiary of Punta Carretas, just two and a half miles from the city center in a barrio of Montevideo, was started as a women’s prison, circa 1896. In 1901, it was decided to make it a penitentiary for men as well.

 In 1970, when Uruguay had the highest per capita rate of political incarceration anywhere in the world, the Government counter-guerrilla operations gradually arrested several members of the MLN-T and incarcerated them in the Punta Carretas maximum security prison.

On March 23, 1970, a police officer recognized José Mujica at a bar in the center of Montevideo while meeting one of his contacts. The policeman called for backup. Seeing a police car pulling up to the entrance of the bar, Mujica pulled out his gun and opened fire. During the ensuing shootout Mujica shot two policemen, and he himself was hit twice. While lying sprawled on the floor, one policeman shot him four more times.

On April 1, 1970, Al Rojo Vivo on page 6 of its issue No. 226 reported the incident. It said:

En el tiroteo en el bar “La Vía”, …resultaron dos heridos. Uno de gravedad, un anti-social, y un funcionario policial. Como consecuencia de una delación cayeron cuatro integrantes del grupo de “reos”.

Translation:

In the shootout in the bar “La Vía”… two were wounded. An anti-social, gravely, and a police officer. Following a denunciation four members of the group of “criminals” were apprehended.

Later, on the same page we find:

Resultó herido de gravedad el “reo” José Alberto Mujica Cordano, conocido como “Pepe”. Sus documentos estaban a nombre de José Antonio Mones Morelli.

Translation:

It turned out the seriously wounded was “criminal” José Alberto Mujica Cordano, known as ” Pepe “. His documents were in the name of José Antonio Mones Morelli.

Luckily, the doctor who treated Mujica was also a Tupamaro, hiding in plain sight. After a year, José Mujica recovered from the bullet wounds,. He was once again apprehended and incarcerated along with the other captured Tupamaros in the Punta Carretas prison.

On July 30, 1971,  thirty-eight women Tupamaros escaped from the Punta Carretas maximum security prison through the tunnel dug from the outside, connecting their cell floor with the city sewer system.

Raúl Sendic, was captured on August 7, 1970.

Operation El Abuso 

In Uruguay, everybody knows about “The Great Escape,” or “The Escape from Punta Carretas,” or “El Abuso” the code name the Tupamaros used for it. For a certain generation of Uruguayans, it is a word that has passed into national lore. In Spanish, the term “abuso means “abuse” or “mockery” or “outrage.”

The huge penitentiary complex had 400 cells. The Tupamaro guerrillas were held in 95 cells.

In addition to the guards inside, there were platoons of 60 to 80 soldiers guarding the outer walls.

From the day the first compañero was arrested, the Tupamaro guerrillas planned to escape from the maximum security prison. First, they ruminated on taking over the prison. Since the prison complex was colossal, there was no way to commandeer it by surprise without a bloody scuffle. The Tupamaros always tried to avoid violence at all costs and some compañeros were averse to killing. So, they concentrated their efforts to escape by other means.

Conditions in Punta Carretas were more relaxed than in other prisons. Since most Tupamaro guerrillas were educated and  extremely organized, they quickly established themselves within the prison walls and exercised pressure on the corrupt prison guards and the warden. Thus, the prisoners were allowed to receive food from their families and sympathizers from the outside, which they would cook inside their cells using kerosene stoves. They shared their food, even with non-Tupamaros. In addition to food, family members also brought books and magazines.

Regular soldiers patrolled the outer wall. The guards inside the prison were contracted non-military men with families to feed and had chosen the profession for its excellent pay and job security.

The guards allowed the Tupamaro prisoners to bet on horse races and purchase lottery tickets. For the right price, they would bring in newspapers or alcohol. The prisoners were provided classes in woodwork and other crafts and were allowed to play soccer daily games the field behind the cellblock.

In the early months of 1971, the Tupamaro male prisoners lodged in the Punta Carretas maximum security prison started digging a tunnel to escape from the state prison. They called it Mangangá, but their effort was thwarted by heavy rain.

On August 5, 1971, the Tupamaro prisoners again started digging patiently another tunnel, planned down to the smallest detail, which they secretly called the operation El Abuso (The Abuse).

Outside the prison walls, most of the active Tupamaros knew nothing about operation El Abuso.

Some Tupamaros were given the task of stealing prison plans and to pass them on to the inmates. The plans were cut into small pieces and stuffed inside small nylon capsules. The passing of the capsules was accomplished by the male Tupamaros while they kissed the female Tupamara prisoners during visits. At times, the recipient female Tupamaras swallowed the capsules to avoid detection, and retrieved the bits of plans from their faeces. The plan bits were reassembled inside the prison.

The walls of the cells in Punta Carretas were a foot-and-a-half thick and made of field brick. The prisoners scraped away the mortar between the bricks in their cell walls using metal wires and shims collected from their woodwork classes.

The prisoners originally intended to make holes in the walls to hide censored magazines and newspapers. Then, they realized that if they could perforate a small hole through to the next cell, then men on both sides could hold the ends of a wire, pull it back and forth, and remove the mortar between a group of several bricks. Thus, they managed to remove sections of walls about 60 inches wide by 40 inches high. The openings helped them move from one cell to cell to the next.

They disposed the mortar dust in their toilets, or spread them on the football field. They covered the evidence of their work by stuffing paper in the crevices between the bricks, plastering and painting the surface. They got the plaster from their families in bags marked “flour”. At times they covered glaring spots on the walls with posters.

Their activity was not discovered because the Tupamaros convinced the warden to stop making surprise cell inspections, claiming the inspections made them anxious and uneasy.

The Tupamaros were on the second and third floors of the four-storey prison. Through negotiations and pretensions, they managed to get cell transfers for all the compañeros who would participate in the escape. By early September, all the escapees were on one side of the hallway, while the other side was filled with men with light sentences who would be released soon.

They succeeded in connecting together some fifty cells on three floors.

At the same time, they negotiated with the five common prisoners lodged in the ground-floor corner cell #73 to use their cell to dig the escape tunnel.

The Tupamaro prisoners who were not claustrophobic dug a tunnel about 100 feet (30 meters) long, from cell 73 to the house #2535 across the Solano García street, which had been taken over by the Tupamaros.

Digging eight hours a day it took about 30 days to complete. The whole operation was carried out in secret and as such some Tupamaro inmates came to know about the tunnel and the planned escape only on the day before the escape, when all preparation was already in place.

Tupamaros' Tunnel mapDuring the night on the eve of the escape, many Tupamaros participated in disturbing the peace in Cerro and La Teja, a barrio of Montevideo to draw the police force away from the surroundings of Punta Carretas. Several buses and vehicles were torched in those neighborhoods and the tires of dozens of police cars were slashed to immobilize them. However, most of the Tupamaro guerrillas who took part in these clashes had no idea for what purpose they did so.

In the early morning hours of Monday, September 6, 1971, Raúl Sendic, and 105 Tupamaro guerrillas, including five common prisoners, who joined forces in the digging, crawled through the burrow. They emerged through a two-by-two foot square opening in the floor of the living room of the house on the other side of the Solano García street, where an 85-years-old Serrana Auliso, an English teacher, now lives.

The compañeros who were waiting for them in that house, gave each of them a pouch of money and a gun. They escapees exited through the backyard of the house, and were whisked away from the area in two buses, trucks and a few taxis while other compañeros created diversions by burning cars across the town.

Most of the escaped guerrillas were arrested during the next twelve years of military rule.

Among those political prisoners who escaped Punta Carretas Prison on that day were José Mujica, and Eleuterio Fernandez Huidobro, who bore the nickname “Nato” (“Flatnose”). These two Tupamaros were later elected to the senate in 1999 after a term in the House of Representatives and are now the president and Defense Minister of Uruguay respectively.

The “great escape” or “El Abuso” has been recorded in the Guinness Book of World Records in the “Greatest jail breaks” category as follows:

In September 1971 Raúl Sendic and 105 other Tupamaro guerrillas plus five nonpolitical prsioners, escaped from a Uruguyan prison through a tunnel 298 ft long.”

The political consequences of the prison break were enormous. On September 9, 1971, President Jorge Pacheco-Areco instructed the armed forces to conduct anti-guerrilla operations against the MLN-T through Decree No. 566/971. The Uruguayan Congress suspended habeas corpus, (a writ or court order that requires a person under arrest to be brought before a judge or into court.

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The Tupamaros, Terrorists of Uruguay – Part 5: Assassination of Daniel A. Mitrione 


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.Myself . By T.V. Antony Raj

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Daniel A. Mitrione

Daniel A. Mitrione

Daniel A. Mitrione (August 4, 1920 – August 10, 1970) was an Italian-born American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent and a United States government advisor for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Latin America.

Dan Mitrione‘s specialty was interrogation. From 1960 to 1967, he worked with the Brazilian police, first in Belo Horizonte then in Rio de Janeiro at a time when political opponents were systematically tortured, imprisoned without trial and killed. Mitrione was one among the US advisers who taught Brazilian police how much electric shock to apply to prisoners at a time without killing them. He is quoted as having once said:

The precise pain, in the precise place, in the precise amount, for the desired effect.”

In 1969, Mitrione was posted as the Chief Public Safety Adviser at the American Embassy in Uruguay by the CIA on a clandestine and secret program, under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), an organization sometimes used as a front for training foreign police in counterinsurgency methods.

When the Tupamaros learned that he was a riot control specialist advising the Uruguayan police in riot control. They targeted him in retaliation for causing the death of student protesters by his advice, and planned to kidnap him.

Mitrione was a very cold mannered person with no compassion. In truth, Dan Mitrione was in Montevideo to teach the police how to extract information out of suspects by torture. Former Uruguayan police officials and CIA operatives claimed Mitrione had taught torture techniques to the Uruguayan police in the basement of his Montevideo home where he had a sealed sound proof room. The technique included the use of electrical shocks delivered to the mouths and genitals of the victims.

It has also been alleged that he had about 150 detainees, most of them “bichicomes” (beggars) of Montevideo, and they were executed once they had served their purpose.

Torture

Yet, at a later interview, Raúl Sendic said the Tupamaros did not know that Mitrione was an expert in torture.

On July 31, 1970, the Tupamaros kidnapped Dan Mitrione near his home in Montevideo. While being kidnapped, he was shot in one shoulder. The Tupamaros held him in their Cárcel del Pueblo (People’s Prison).

Brazilian Consul Aloysio Dias Gomide was abducted the same day. An attempt to kidnap US Embassy Second Secretary Gordon Jones was foiled.

The specific tactical objective of the Mitrione and Dias Gomide kidnappings and the unsuccessful attempt on Gordon Jones was to liberate about 150 Tupamaros then imprisoned or detained by the government. This was the largest ransom ever demanded for kidnapped diplomats.

Jorge Pacheco-Areco , President of Uruguay from December 6, 1967 to March 1, 1972 (Source: elmuertoquehabla.blogspot.in)

Jorge Pacheco-Areco , President of Uruguay from December 6, 1967 to March 1, 1972 (Source: elmuertoquehabla.blogspot.in)

At that time, the liberal democratic Government of Uruguay was in decline. It was headed by Jorge Pacheco Areco, an extremely stubborn and autocratic president. The stupendous demand placed before the president posed an institutional problem due to separation of powers in the country. Most Tupamaro prisoners were held by the Judicial branch and the Executive branch had no jurisdiction over those prisoners, and the President could not unilaterally authorize their freedom. At that time, the liberal democratic Government of Uruguay was in decline. Backed up by the Interior Minister, the president refused to negotiate with the Tupamaros and also declined to communicate with them.

As a police officer Mitrione knew that the US government would not consent to exchange 150 prisoners to save one man’s life, but he had hoped for a possible swap.

As a police officer Mitrione knew that the US government would not consent to exchange 150 prisoners to save one man’s life, but he had hoped for a possible swap.

During the first days of captivity Mitrione was arrogant and confident. However, on the fifth day of his captivity, when Mitrione turned 50 on August 4, he learned that President Richard Nixon did not ask the government of Uruguay, to free 150 detained Tupamaros to save his life. Now, he softened and took part in ideological discussions with his captors.

As the prisoner exchange was not taking place, the Tupamaros sentenced Mitrione on August 8, 1970, to be executed at noon the following day. However, the execution actually took place on August 10, 1970, at 4 am.

Mitrione’s body was found in a car with two bullets in the head. There were no other visible signs of maltreatment, beyond the fact that, during the kidnapping, he had been shot in one shoulder – a wound for which he had evidently been treated while in captivity.

The Nixon Administration through spokesman Ron Ziegler affirmed that Mitrione’s “devoted service to the cause of peaceful progress in an orderly world will remain as an example for free men everywhere.”

Dan Mitrione’s funeral was largely publicized by the US media. Several high-ranking officials from the Nixon administration, including Richard Nixon’s secretary of state William Rogers, attended his funeral. In Richmond, Indiana, Frank Sinatra and Jerry Lewis held a benefit concert for Dan Mitrione’s family.

This cold-blooded murder proved beyond doubt that the leadership of MLN-T had changed. It was now more radical and violent. Its members were not keen on leading the Uruguayan society towards socialism, but were bent on waging war on the affluent whom they considered as their enemies.

Memorial Plaque for Dan Mitrione

Memorial Plaque for Dan A. Mitrione

On March 21, 1973, The New York Times reported the capture of four of the men involved in the 1970 kidnapping-murder of Dan A. Mitrione by Uruguyan security officials. The man who pulled the trigger was identified as Antonio Mas, 25, a Spanish citizen who joined Tuparnaros when he was a student at the University of Montevideo. The authorities said they arrested Mas and three other participants in the crime, Henry Engler, the leader of the command, Esteban Jorge Pereira and Rodolfo Woolf.  Engler as the leader of the command had ordered the killing of Dan Mitrione.  The authorities said that a fifth member, Armando Blanco Katras was killed in the clash with the police. 

État de Siège (State of Siege), the movie

State of Siege (French title: État de Siège) is a 1972 French film directed by Costa Gavras starring Yves Montand and Renato Salvatori. This film is regarded as one of Costa-Gavras’ finest creations. The story is based on the actual kidnapping and killing of Dan Mitrione.

Many US officials were against the screening of the film. They said it was a hyperbole about US involvement in Latin America and other third world countries. In Washington, DC, it was removed from a special screening at the John F. Kennedy Center, only to be run uncut on a local TV station. In the late 1970s, during the investigations and committee hearings on the CIA and other government groups, many who decried the film as false found themselves admitting involvement in the internal affairs of Latin American countries.

In the film, Philip Michael Santore, an official of the USAID, posted to a fictional South American country in the early 1970s. Santore is kidnapped by a group of urban guerillas.

The film explores the often brutal consequences of the struggle between the repressive government of Montevideo and the leftist Tupamaro guerrillas using interrogation of Santore by his captors as a backdrop.

The government decimates the revolutionary group using death squads. The surviving members vote to execute Santore, who is accused of political manipulation and training the police in torture.

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The Tupamaros, Terrorists of Uruguay – Part 4: The Kidnappings


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.Myself . By T.V. Antony Raj

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A demonstration by Tupamaros

A demonstration by Tupamaros

There were different opinions in Uruguay and elsewhere around the world about the activities of the Tupamaros, the most proficient urban guerrilla organization in existence at that time. The Tupamaros were the most potent, although not the only leftist movement in Uruguay. It became clear that traditional pro-Soviet and even pro-Chinese political leaders believed that MLN tactics would only provoke the government into adopting a harder line against leftist organizations in general.

Many scholars think that terrorism should not be defined as violence directed only against civilian targets because terrorists make no distinctions between the military and civilians. Attacks on off-duty police and military personnel can be classified as terrorism as much as attacks on civilian targets. Although the Tupamaros may have been “considerate in their attacks,” violence in the form of bombings, kidnappings, and executions intended to frighten a population still constitutes terrorism.

The leaders of the Tupamaros said that to achieve improved social justice in Uruguay, violence and bloodshed would be used only as a last recourse. Nevertheless, they resorted to kidnappings and their methods became increasingly murderous like any other insurgent movement.

The use of violence became a part of their ideology. They considered the use of violence as legitimate and desirable to achieve their goals. They used violence intentionally with the knowledge and expectation that the government would respond with harsh and repressive security countermeasures, which would increase support of the masses for the Tupamaros. In fact, they were successful in gaining support of the masses in the early stages of their campaign.

The Tupamaros assassinated Emet Motto, a frigate captain, and Colonel Artigas Alvarez. These assassinations created a climate of terror in the security forces and may have led to the desire of the forces for a fast and vigorous response to fight terrorism.

The MLN-T dedicated to Marxist ideologies was the first organization in the free world to direct violence in the name of revolution against fellow countrymen.

Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller

Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller

On June 21, 1969, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller met with Uruguayan leaders at isolated Punta del Este while students rampaged in Montevideo in protest against his fact-finding visit. Avoiding direct clashes with police and army patrols, bands of students staged hit-and-run strikes. They smashed windows of cars, stores, and homes, threw firebombs at a Mormon church, a bank, and a General Motors factory.

After Governor Rockefeller’s visit, Tupamaro attacks became increasingly ambitious and bloody, resulting in the deaths of many policemen, as the terrorists campaigned and took the offensive with the full array of guerilla tactics.

The Kidnappings

The first political kidnapping by the Tupamaros took place on August 7, 1968, when they abducted Ulises Pereyra Reverbal, Director of the State Electric Power and Telephone (UTE) monopoly. He was an adviser to President Jorge Pacheco-Areco as well as a close friend.

The Tupamaros apparently targeted Pereyra because he had urged the President to adopt a hard line against labor and students during recent unrest in the country.

He was kidnapped by four or five armed terrorists outside his seaside home.

The Tupamaros apparently made no specific ransom demands and instead used the incident for propaganda against the government. However, they said that Pereyra’s life would depend on the treatment given to Tupamaro prisoners and that he would be released whenever the organization leaders felt like releasing him. While he was being held, around 3,000 policemen mobilized to find him raided the national university, where fierce clashes broke out with students. This unsuccessful reaction by the government helped the kidnappers to discredit the government further.

The kidnappers held him till August 12, 1968, and released him unharmed.

Gaetano Pellegrini Giampietro was a leading banker and Managing Editor of the newspapers “La Manana” and “El Diario“. His father was the former Italian Finance Minister under Mussolini.

The Uruguayan leftists had frequently criticized Pellegrini because in a bank strike earlier that year, he had served as a spokesman for the bank management in the negotiations and had adopted a hard bargaining line.

On September 9, 1969, two gunmen, members of a Tupamaro commando group abducted Pellegrini as he sat in a car outside his newspaper office.

The following day, as conditions for Pellegrini’s release, a clandestine Tupamaro radio broadcast required a settlement favorable to striking bank workers by the following day, September 11, 1969. The Tupamaros also warned that if any street demonstrators were killed by police, Pellegrini’s life would be in danger.

Two weeks after the kidnapping, the Tupamaros warned the police to abandon their search for Pellegrini if they did not want to endanger his life.

Ironically, the bank strike was settled before the deadline by coincidence rather than as a result of the threat.

Pellegrini was finally set free on November 21, 1969, after 73 days in captivity, following the payment of 15 million pesos (about ₤25,000) by his close friends in ransom money, as donations to a workers’ hospital and a primary school in Montevideo. The Tupamaros telephoned his close friend Dr. Eugenio Barofio before abandoning him on a quay at Buceo Yachting Port, outside Montevideo.

Pellegrini was unhurt. Barofio picked the apparently exhausted Pellegrini in his car and took him home to be reunited with his worried wife.

Daniel Pereyra Monello, a criminal-court judge. From 1977 onward, Pereyra was the arraigning judge in the trial of most of the approximately 150 Tupamaros who had been charged with violating the state security law and other offenses.

On July 28, 1970, the Tupamaros seized Daniel Pereyra Monello. The abductors assured his wife that they only wanted to talk with her husband and that he would be released within 48 hours.

In the meantime, a rumor circulated that the release of Tupamaro prisoners would be demanded by the terrorists  in exchange for releasing the judge.

A spokesman for the President said that the President was averse to the idea of exchanging any prisoners and would not agree any such exchange regardless of the consequences.

Two communiques were issued by the Tupamaros while Pereyra was being interrogated. The first alleged his coverup of police brutality and his prejudice against the Tupamaros. In the second communique, issued on July 30, 1970, two days after the abduction, the Tupamaros announced that they would hold the judge for more than 48 hours, while they continued their interrogation concerning detention and trial procedures.

Judge Pereyra was finally released on August 5, bearing a communique about the three foreign diplomats who were kidnapped two days after Pereyra, on July 31, 1970.

In August of 1970, the Tupamaros kidnapped several foreign individuals as part of an unusual diplomatic kidnapping campaign unfolding a strategic operation called Plan Satan, in which the terrorists sought to provoke a ministerial crisis and foreign intervention, to lead ultimately to the downfall of the Uruguayan government. The kidnappings by the Tupamaros peaked in 1970 and 1971. The kidnapped people were held and interrogated in the Cárcel del Pueblo (People’s Prison).

Claude L. Fly of Fort Collins, Colorado, an American soil expert and a contract employee of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), an organization sometimes used as a front for training foreign police in counterinsurgency methods. In 1970, while working as a consultant to the Ministry of Agriculture in Uruguay, Fly was kidnapped by the Tupamaros and was held captive for 208 days from August 1970 to March 1971 in either a basement equipped with a wire-mesh ‘cage’ cell or a sweltering tent in a second-floor apartment. The Tupamaros released him after he suffered a heart attack.

Sir Geoffrey Holt Seymour Jackson KCMG, at a news conference in London on September 11, 1971 (Source: news.bbc.co.uk)

Sir Geoffrey Holt Seymour Jackson KCMG, at a news conference in London on September 11, 1971 (Source: news.bbc.co.uk)

The notable among the kidnapped foreign individuals was Sir Geoffrey Holt Seymour Jackson KCMG, the British ambassador to Uruguay.

On January 8, 1971, the Tupamaro guerrillas abducted him in broad daylight as he drove to work in Montevideo, Uruguay.

During his captivity, the abductors allowed Sir Jackson to send one message to his wife.

Many days later, the Tupamaros released a photograph showing Sir Jackson with a long flowing white beard.

In an interview with a Cuban journalist, arranged by his captors, Sir Jackson revealed how he was kept in a windowless cell and jogged barefoot round the mud floor of his cramped jail to keep reasonably fit.

Despite exhaustive searches, the government authorities were clueless and even after questioning hundreds of suspects they were not able to extort any tip-off to his whereabouts.

On the night of September 8, 1971, a statement purporting to come from the Tupamaros was released that said Mr. Jackson would be freed as it was no longer necessary to hold him following the escape of 106 Tupamaros from a Montevideo jail early on Monday, September 6, 1971.

The Tupamaros released him on September 9, 1971, after eight months of captivity. The  government agencies claimed that no ransom demands were ever made for releasing Sir Jackson. However, it came to light later that Edward Heath, the British prime minister at that time, negotiated the deal for Jackson’s release brokered by the Chilean president, Salvador Allende, who had contacts with the Tupamaros and a sum of ₤42,000 was paid as ransom money.

He was kidnapped by the Tupamaro guerrillas on January 8, 1971 in Montevideo, Uruguay. The Tupamaros released him on September 9, 1971 after eight months of captivity. A sum of ₤42,000 was paid as ransom money. Later it came to light that Edward Heath, the British prime minister at that time, negotiated the deal for Jackson’s release brokered by the Chilean president, Salvador Allende, who had contacts with the Tupamaros.

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 Previous - Part 3: Armed propaganda

Next  Part 5: Assassination of Daniel A. Mitrione

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The Tupamaros, Terrorists of Uruguay – Part 3: Armed propaganda


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.Myself . By T.V. Antony Raj

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Tupamaros flag - 2

Armed propaganda

The Tupamaros differed fundamentally from other revolutionary movements by introducing a methodology for social agitation through direct actions and minimizing on political rhetoric and discourse.

In early 1969, the MLN-T endeavored to reveal to the public the intrinsic nature of the capitalist system wherein human rights and even the laws of their nation were subordinate to the real economics of the country, the ruling system, and the military. To educate the public about social justice, socialism, and national liberation through direct actions they launched an operation called ‘armed propaganda‘.

The Tupamaros took over cinema houses and forced the audience to watch slide shows decrying the injustice of liberal democracy.

After identifying significant symbolic targets, they staged guerrilla raids with a minimal amount of violence. The ‘armed propaganda‘ operations would most often end without firing a single shot. To blazon their accomplishment, the group would then leave a poster that said: “The people passed through here.

The Tupamaro guerrillas became notorious in the Uruguayan press for their high-profile female members such as Yessie Macchi, a beautiful Jane Fonda blonde dated by José Mujica. The group’s propaganda minister once told the press:

“… at no point is a woman more equal to a man than when she is holding a .45 in her hand.

Planning a Tupamaro operation demanded a great deal of patience and time. In each instance a set of people would collect data without even knowing for what purpose it would be used later. More often than not, even the participants will not know until the end of the operation. Once the data were gathered, the group command spruced them into a coherent form. They placed high importance to security measures, and enacted their operations without a snag.  The Tupamaros were not allowed to rely on their firearms since their meticulous planning allowed them to act on the spur of the moment and overcome their victims by personal conviction and with an element of surprise.

In 1970, the New York Times stated:

“Unlike other Latin-American guerrilla groups, the Tupamaros normally avoid bloodshed when possible. They try instead to create embarrassment for the Government and general disorder.”

The raid on Financiera Monty

One of the main goals of the Tupamaros was to root out corruption in the government by exposing the illegal activities of its officials.

Lucia Topolansky, currently, wife of José Mujica, orchestrated one of the most captivating actions of the Tupamaro Urban guerrillas – the raid on Financiera Monty, a private banking institution that deals in currency exchange and real estate.

To fund her way through architecture school, Lucia Topolansky, worked at the Financiera Monty. She was outraged when she discovered a clandestine black market financial operation being conducted behind the scenes. She reported the covert illegal activities first to the banking regulators. But they did not bother. Then, she approached the press. But here too, no one was eager to act on her report. In desperation, she contacted some friends in the sprouting rebel group - the Tupamaros.

To conduct a raid on an institution such as the Financiera Monty required a meticulously intelligent network. It was said the intelligence network of the Tupamaros was far more superior to that of the Uruguayan police.

The primary aim of the raid was to gather evidence to report and substantiate the illegalities committed by the establishment.

On February 14, 1969, three young men and a young woman, belonging to the “Liber Arce” commando squad of the Tupamaros strolled casually through the central door of the building of the Banco de Credito where Financiera Monty had their offices. They took the elevator to reach the fourth floor. There they threatened the employees, bound and gagged them. The guerrillas took six account books, various other documents, plus foreign currency (US dollars, Brazilian Cruzeiros, and British pound sterling) worth seven million Uruguayan pesos, to prove the unlawful activities of the company.

After the raid, the Tupamaros tacitly left the building with the same cool composure they had when they came in.

The news of the raid came to light only on February 23, 1960. Why? Because Financiera Monty had not complained to the authorities.

The Tupamaros sent a statement to the press, the police, and to a judge denouncing Financiera Monty and their illegal activities and shady operations.

The scandal prompted the judge to initiate immediate action to clarify the matter since the company already had in its immediate past a very dark history. A fire broke out on the eighth floor of the building of the Banco de Credito, where Financiera Monty had more offices, presumably the fire was started by them to destroy other implicating documents.

The subsequent investigation into the Monty incident resulted in a major scandal and the resignation of several government officials with ties to the Company.

The officials of Financiera Monty tried to explain their silence, claiming that they wanted to carry out their own internal investigation first to ascertain whether any of its employees was involved, and to avoid panic among their customers. The explanation did not satisfy anyone.

The raid on Casino at Hotel San Rafael 

Punta del Este is a city located in the peninsular southern tip of Uruguay in the department of Maldonado. It is one of the finest beach resorts in Latin America.

Hotel Casino San Rafael Punta Del Este Uruguay (Source:  articulo.mercadolibre.com.ar)

Hotel Casino San Rafael Punta Del Este Uruguay (Source: articulo.mercadolibre.com.ar)

Opened in 1948, the plush Tudor style Hotel San Rafael was the main hotel from 1950 to 1980 in Punta del Este. It was the symbol of the rise of Punta Del East as one of the most prestigious beach resorts in South America.

The facilities offered by the hotel and its casino attracted the patrician families of the Río de la Plata as well as political figures, celebrities in arts and entertainment, and the royalty around the world. The large meeting rooms of Hotel San Rafael, including the Gothic Hall that could accommodate up to 1500 attendees, served as the meeting place of many American presidents and dignitaries of other nations.

Tuesday, February 18, 1969, was carnival day in Punta del Este, just four days after the Tupamaros raided Financiera Monty.

The casino of Hotel San Rafael operated in two shifts: from 11 am to 4 pm, and from 9 pm to 5 am of the following day.

It was 5 pm and Manuel Sunhary, head teller of the casino had just had his lunch.

Two Tupamaros under the command of Robaina Mario Mendez, one dressed as a policeman and another displaying a civilian police ID card, confronted Sunhary.

“It is a routine procedure,” said the man in uniform.

They pushed Sunhary into a blue Volkswagen van and handcuffed him. The van then headed towards the Casino.

It was the recess after the first game session of the day. There was not much movement at the Casino except for a few janitors cleaning the place. The cashiers were busy counting the heavy collection from the morning game session.

At the Casino more Tupamaros joined them swelling the group to eight men, all armed with pistols and machine guns. The assailants entered the offices without causing an alarm.

In a few minutes they locked all the staff in the management office.

They forced Sunhary, who held the key, to open the main safe which contained the money, amounting to approximately 55 million Uruguayan pesos (US $220,000) in canvas bags.

All the Tupamaros enacted the raid without covering their face, but there was no consensus among those who saw the assailants to identify them. However, the witnesses said that the assailants appeared to be educated, cultured and young. They were not rude or vulgar. All their actions were in order and perfectly synced. Each of them had a specific role to fulfill and knew his role perfectly.

The knowledge the Tupamaros had gathered about the turf was amazing. The players knew where everything: each door, who had the key to that door, and even the names of the employees who held the keys.

Several days later, the Tupamaros came to know that a part of the haul was tips that belonged to a pool for casino employees. In a press release the Tupamaros graciously offered to return that amount belonging to the casino employees.

The Raid on Pando City

The central square of Pando with the Church of the Immaculate Conception in the background (Source: Hoverfish/Gallery)

The central square of Pando with the Church of the Immaculate Conception in the background (Source: Hoverfish/Gallery)

The raid on the modest city of Pando in October 1969 was timed to honor the second anniversary of Che Guevara’s death and to publicize the presence of the Tupamaros whose eventual goal was to take over Uruguay.

Pando is a small city about 14 miles (23 km) northeast of Montevideo in Canelones Department of Uruguay. It is an important commercial and industrial center, which has today become part of the wider metropolitan area of Montevideo. In 1969 it had a population around 14,000 people.

On the forenoon of October 8, 1969, José Mujica, then aged 35, along with nine other men dressed for a funeral, piled into a Volkswagen van and waited on the side of a two-lane road that led from Montevideo, to the city of Pando.

Half a dozen cars and a hearse, rented from the fanciest funeral home in the country, drove past, and the Volkswagen joined the funeral procession. Veritably, there was no funeral to attend, no corpse, and no mourners. They were Tupamaros.

About three miles from Pando city, the men-in-black after subduing the drivers of the hired cars and the hearse, stuffed them into the back of the Volkswagen.

José Mujica, clutching his Spanish-made Z-45 submachine gun, got into the backseat of one of the cars. The funeral cavalcade of the hearse, black cars and the Volkswagen van entered the city where many other Tupamaros, who had already arrived in the city, disguised as vaudevillian characters commenced acting in front of the city’s main police station.

José Mujica and his team disabled the telephone exchange without firing a single shot. They cut all telephone lines and other communication channels.

Along with the intricate planning, careful disguises, and hiding-in-plain-sight, it was the practice with the Tupamaros as an important feature, to pontificate with the intent of converting other citizens to their cause. So, on that day too, as the stunned telephone operators lay on the ground, Mujica went into a tirade about the Che Guevara–inspired Tupamaros revolution that would soon ignite in Uruguay.

The Tupamaros confronted the officers at the front desk with their petty, meaningless complaints. Then in a coordinated manner drew their guns and raided the precinct. They locked the policemen in the jail cells and traded fire and grenades with one policeman who had held out.

The small battalion Tupamaros took over the town, robbed Pando’s three banks. While robbing the city’s main bank branch a policeman opened fire, causing a delay which helped the police to surround the town. In the ensuing brazen, and chaotic shootout that spilled out into the streets a police officer, one civilian and three Tupamaros were killed and many more injured while retreating back to Montevideo. Around 25 Tupamaros were arrested by the police on that day.

The entire operation took about half an hour.

In the interim, José Mujica, who had already fled Pando and returned to Montevideo, like the rest of the country, sat at a bar listening to the action unfold on the radio.

The Raid on the Uruguayan Naval Academy

On Friday, May 29, 1970, a group of 50 Tupamaros raided the headquarters of the Uruguayan naval academy. Several of them were in navy uniforms. They overpowered the guards, assembled all the naval cadets in the courtyard, and forced them to watch while they ransacked the entire place of its firearms, equipment, and other paraphernalia. They got away with a truckload of arms, including 300 rifles, ammunition and tear gas.

On the morning of Sunday, May 31, 1970, one terrorist was killed in Chacras, 13 miles from Montevideo during a search of a house by security forces. Two other guerrillas were reported killed and several captured during a gunfight with security forces in a suburb of Montevideo as authorities pressed a hunt for the guerrillas who raided the naval academy two days before.

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Next → Part 4: The Kidnappings

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The Tupamaros, Terrorists of Uruguay – Part 2: The Formative Years


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.Myself . By T.V. Antony Raj

 

Tupamaros flag

The first Tupamaro robbery operation was a raid on the Swiss Rifle Club in the city of Colonia del Sacramento in southwestern Uruguay on July 31, 1963. They stole 28 World War I and World War II-era guns. It was the first of the many raids conducted by the Tupamaros to enhance their stockpile of armaments.

This armed action signaled the birth of Latin America’s most famous urban guerrilla group, the Tupamaros. From then on, the Tupamaros pursued a strategy that combined political activities and guerrilla tactics. They forged the slogan “Words divide us; action unites us.

At this time José Mujica was an active Tupamaro. Though the Tupamaros numbered less than a hundred, they pulled off some spectacular feats.

During the formative years the Tupamaros faced both success and failure.

In September 1963, some Tupamaros were involved in a normal car accident and refused medical assistance. This created suspicion and when they were interrogated, they revealed that Raúl Sendic was their leader. The authorities arrested Sendic.

In December 1963, around 20 Tupamaros attacked a food delivery truck and distributed the food among the poor living in the slums of Montevideo. This earned them a Robin Hood-like following among the poor in Uruguay. The international media immediately labelled them “Robin Hood guerrillas.”

In raids conducted in January and April 1964, they stole more weapons and explosives from a customs warehouse and a munitions manufacturing plant.

In March 1965, three Tupamaros were arrested after they made a mess of an attempted robbery.

On August 8, 1965, the Tupamaros attacked and bombed of the Bayer chemical plant in Montevideo. And, for the first time the Tupamaros claimed responsibility for an attack.

In December 1966, two Tupamaros were killed and several more arrested after a failed attempt to steal a car.

They broadcast their propaganda by hijacking radio stations during major football games.

The urban guerillas faced the problem of operating in a purely urban environment such as the capital city of Montevideo and the invariably flat rural areas of Uruguay in contrast to the terrain that provided refuge for revolutionaries in other countries like the Sierra Maestra mountain range of Cuban revolutionaries, and the Ya’nan mountainous region of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung).

At the beginning, Tupamaros abstained from armed actions and violence. They claimed that they were not a guerrilla group, but a political movement. But later on, use of violence became a part of their ideology. They considered the use of violence as legitimate and desirable to achieve their goals.

At the beginning, Tupamaros abstained from armed actions and violence. They claimed that they were not a guerrilla group, but a political movement. The leaders of the Tupamaros said that to achieve improved social justice in Uruguay, violence and bloodshed would be used only as a final recourse. Nevertheless, later on, they resorted to kidnappings and their methods became increasingly murderous like any other insurgent movement. Use of violence became a part of their ideology. They considered the use of violence as legitimate and desirable to achieve their goals. The MLN-T dedicated to Marxist ideologies was the first organization in the free world to direct violence in the name of revolution against fellow countrymen.

The Tupamaros used violence intentionally with the knowledge and expectation that the government would retaliate with harsh and repressive security countermeasures, which would increase support of the masses for the Tupamaros. In fact, they were successful in gaining support of the masses in the early stages of their campaign.

Tupamaros Signboard

Robert Moss, the Australian historian writes that a key element of the Tupamaros’ strategy was “to drive the government towards the use of ‘counterterrorism‘ in the hope that this would arouse liberal critics at home and abroad and weaken [the government].”

The Tupamaros started robbing banks and other businesses to finance their movement. They also raided investment banks and publicized their fraudulent bookkeeping methods. They even took up judicial proceedings against the owners of these investment banks.

In 1967, with their successful robberies and Robin Hood-type activities the Tupamaros gained popularity among the subjugated masses.

On March 18, 2009 in “La columna de Pepe Preguntón” in the Uruguayan newspaper El País quoted José Mujica justifying the robberies:

Yo expropié recursos para la lucha en la que soñaba con cambiar la realidad, ¿tá? Robar es cuando usted se la guarda (la plata) para usted y se la gasta usted.

Translation: “I appropriated resources for the fight in which I dreamed of altering reality. Stealing is when you keep the money to spend yourself.”

The column also listed, in the words of Mujica, some of the “appropriation” perpetrated by the Tupamaros:

Date

Appropriated from

Amount in US$

10/14/64 Banco de Cobranzas

5,800

10/09/68 Banco de Londres

20,000

10/03/68 Banco Comercial

12,860

18/10/68 Sociedad de Bancos

23,560

24/10/68 Banco Comercial

13,700

01/11/68 UBUR

13,316

29/11/68 Casino Carrasco

25,000

10/12/68 Banco Mercantil

1,880

12/12/68 Banco Popular

13,668

30/12/68 From 2 assaults

48,000

07/01/69 From assaulting a firm

32,000

14/02/69 Financiera Monty

2,400

18/02/69 Casino San Rafael

222,000

13/03/69 Bancaria de Fray Bentos

60,000

05/06/69 The combined total robbed from two banks

54,000

And the list goes on.

On April 24, 2009, in his article NOTICIAS CULTURALES CUANDO EL PEPE MUJICA ERA JOSÉ ANTONIO MORELLI (News and Views of the Colarado Party When Pepe Mujica Was José Antonia Morelli), published in Colonia Total, R. Villasuso admonished José Mujica saying:

“Debería saber el señor Mujica, que el que mata es ASESINO, el que secuestra es SECUESTRADOR, el que roba es un LADRÓN, y el que miente, MENTIROSO.”

Translation: Mr. Mujica should know that one who kills is a MURDERER, one who kidnaps is a KIDNAPPER, one who steals is a THIEF, and one who lies is a LIAR.

In June 1968, President Jorge Pacheco, aiming to suppress labour unrest, imposed a state of emergency and repealed all constitutional safeguards. The government started repressing various groups, particularly the Tupamaros. The government locked up political dissidents, used torture during interrogations and banned public demonstrations.

The Tupamaros retaliated by more robberies, political kidnappings and assassinations.

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